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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented for review is whether the language of 
Section 77-27-10(2) prevents the Board of Pardons from ordering any 
parolee to complete an extended period of intensive sexual therapy 
at a of community correctional centers as a "special condition of 
parole." 
The applicable standard of review is well-settled: 
On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, "we survey 
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and 
judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable 
basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be 
convinced that the writ should be granted." 
Webb v. Van Per Veur, 853 P.2d 898 (Utah App. 1993) (citing cases) . 
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OP DISMISSAL 
On January 5, 1994, Judge Frank G. Noel of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah issued an order 
dismissing Petitioner/Appellant Nicholas V. Banner's Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus as being "frivolous on its face" for the 
following reasons: 
The provision of the Utah Code relied upon by Petitioner is 
not a limitation on the Board's authority except insofar as 
it requires the Board [of Pardons] to order, at a minimum, 
outpatient therapy. The Board is also required to exercise 
its judgment in such a way as to reasonably protect the com-
munity and to assist the offender to lead a law-abiding life. 
The references provision of the code in no way prevents the 
Board from ordering inpatient treatment as a condition of 
parole. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
from the denial of the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 
to §78-2a-2(g), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This case is about power. The State of Utah has plenary power 
subject only to the limitations based upon its powers by the State 
and Federal Constitutions. The Board of Pardons is an independent 
board with both constitutional and statutory powers. Those powers 
are plenary within its realm of responsibility subject only to the 
limitations based on the State and Federal Constitutions. Pursuant 
to those powers, the Utah Board of Pardons established the policy 
or practice of paroling criminal offenders to community corrections 
centers for the purpose of completing intensive sex therapy. 
The Courts have determined that Utah's Parole Release Statute 
does not create any liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because that statutory 
scheme does not contain the substantive statutory predicates that 
would require to the Board of Pardons to parole a criminal offender 
if the conditions were met. Instead, Utah's parole release scheme 
provides the Utah Board of Pardons the discretion to decide when to 
parole any criminal offender under their jurisdiction. 
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Petitioner/Appellant Nicholas V. Banner filed a writ of habeas 
corpus alleging that the clear and unambiguous language of § 77-27-
10(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, contains a substantive 
predicate [whenever a sexual offender is released on parole], that 
affects his liberty interests and contains the mandatory language 
["shall"] requiring the Utah Board of Pardons to order "outpatient 
sexual counseling and therapy" as a condition of his parole. Once 
the Board decides to release an offender on parole, that predicate 
triggers the Board's duty to impose "outpatient sexual counseling 
and therapy" as a condition of the sex offender's parole. 
Petitioner/Appellant alleges that the Utah Board of Pardon's 
policy or practice of paroling sexual offenders to the community 
corrections center to complete additional sexual therapy programs 
directly conflicts with the clear statutory language of § 77-27-
10(2) and the Board of Pardons violates the civil rights of sex 
offenders by violating the clear and unambiguous language of that 
statute. 
Petitioner/Appellant does not dispute that the Utah Department 
of Corrections can release inmates to community corrections centers 
[also known as "halfway houses"] to complete additional, intensive 
sex therapy programs. The halfway house concept includes providing 
inmates the opportunity to enter a halfway house as a intermediate 
step between in-cell incarceration and release to parole. However, 
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once the Board of Pardons paroles the sexual offender, §77-27-10(2) 
requires the Board of Pardons order "outpatient sexual counseling 
and treatment" as a condition of the sex offender's parole and does 
not empower them to parole sex offenders to inpatient residential 
treatment centers for additional sex therapy. 
Nor does this Petitioner/Appellant argue that the Legislature 
of the State of Utah would not have the power to allow the Utah 
Board of Pardons to parole sex offenders to inpatient residential 
treatment centers for additional sex therapy. Petitioner/Appellant 
does argue that the Legislature has not yet acted to do so. 
The practical effects of the Utah Board of Pardons' policy or 
practice of paroling inmates to halfway houses are that the Pardons 
Board has delegated power to determine whether sexual offenders 
meet program requirements to sexual therapists and treatment teams 
and allows them to determine when to violate sex offenders' paroles 
if their program requirements are not met. This results in another 
form of "swinging door" because the shortage of beds causes sexual 
therapists and treatment teams to recommend parole revocations that 
they might not otherwise recommend in order to make room for other 
sex offenders that the Board of Pardons has elected to parole to 
the community corrections centers. The Board of Pardons gives the 
sex therapist and treatment teams considerable deference to their 
professional psychological expertise. As a practical matter, sex 
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offenders who need the sexual therapy are routinely having their 
paroles violated by sex therapists and treatment teams because the 
State of Utah has failed or refused to provide sufficient financial 
resources to the community corrections centers and because the Utah 
Board of Pardons' intentional decision to ignore the mandates of 
§ 77-27-10(2) results in decisions to remove sex offenders from a 
sex therapy program at a community correction center and are then 
treated that removal as a violation of the sex offender's parole. 
Since numerous sex offenders are paroled to community corrections 
centers for therapy, are removed, are later re-paroled to community 
corrections centers, and are removed again, the Board's policy or 
practice of paroling sex offenders to community corrections centers 
is having an extremely adverse impact on the future possibility of 
parole for those offenders. 
Course of the Case and Disposition Below 
The Utah Board of Pardons paroled the Petitioner/Appellant, 
Nicholas V. Banner, to the Freemont Community Corrections Center, 
2588 West 2365 So., West Valley City, Utah 84119, and ordered him 
to satisfactorily complete the sex therapy program at the Freemont 
Community Corrections Center as a condition of his parole. 
Petitioner/Appellant, believing the Board of Pardon's "special 
condition" requiring him to be reincarcerated to a halfway house 
for intensive "in-patient sexual therapy" as the condition of his 
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parole when § 77-27-10(2) mandates the imposition of "outpatient 
mental health counseling and treatment" as a condition of his 
parole, sought to have that discrepancy resolved by Assistant 
Attorney General Kirk Torgensen and by the Utah Board of Pardons, 
and thereby, exhausted his state administrative remedies. See 
Addendum A, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus attached hereto and 
incorporated herein, pp. 3-4, paragraphs 6-10 and Exhibits thereto. 
In response thereto, Petitioner/Appellant received a letter 
dated 29 November 1993 from Assistant Attorney General James H. 
Beadles, stating that § 77-27-10(2) "sets a minimum (outpatient 
therapy) but does not restrict the Board from going beyond that 
minimal requirement in certain cases." See Exhibit 5, attached to 
Addendum A, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
On December 10, 1993, Petitioner/Appellant wrote a letter to 
Michael R. Sibbett, Chairman for the Utah State Board of Pardons 
complaining inter alia that the Board's policy/custom of paroling 
sex offenders to community corrections centers for sexual therapy 
was inconsistent with laws of the State of Utah, including § 77-27-
10(2) . See Exhibit 6, attached to Addendum A, Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
On December 22, 1993, John Green, Administrative Coordinator, 
Utah Board of Pardons, answered the letter that was addressed to 
Chairman Michael R. Sibbett. Once again, Mr. Green claimed that 
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the language of §77-27-10(2) sets a minimum statutory requirement 
in sex offender cases," but claims that "the Board has the discre-
tion to require additional sex offender therapy as a condition of 
parole beyond the minimum stated in the statute." 
Thereafter, Petitioner/Appellant filed his Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, alleging inter alia that the Board's policy or 
custom of paroling sex offenders to Community Corrections Centers 
with the condition that they successfully complete sexual offender 
therapy, subjected Petitioner/Appellant to a "flagrant violation of 
his constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining parole 
release" subject to the conditions set by § 77-27-10(2). 
On January 5, 1994, the Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel ordered 
Petitioner/Appellant's Petition dismissed as being frivolous on its 
face for the following reasons: 
The provision of the Utah Code relied upon by Petitioner is 
not a limitation on the Board's authority except insofar as 
it requires the Board [of Pardons] to order, at a minimum, 
outpatient therapy. The Board is also required to exercise 
its judgment in such a way as to reasonably protect the com-
munity and to assist the offender to lead a law-abiding life. 
The references provision of the code in no way prevents the 
Board [of Pardons] from ordering inpatient treatment as a 
condition of parole. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. Petitioner/Appellant Nicholas Vaughn Banner is a citizen 
of the State of Utah, and is impecunious. 
2. The Utah Board of Pardons ordered Petitioner/Appellant to 
satisfactorily complete the sexual therapy program at the Freemont 
Community Corrections Center, 2588 West 2365 So., West Valley City, 
Utah 84119, as a condition of his parole. 
3. The Freemont Community Corrections Center is operated by 
the Utah State Department of Corrections. 
4. Respondent Utah Board of Pardons is empowered by the State 
of Utah with the authority to decide when and under what conditions 
Petitioner may be released from incarceration, subject to Title 77, 
Chapter 27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and other laws of 
the State of Utah. 
5. Petitioner/Appellant's writ of habeas corpus included the 
documentation regarding his criminal convictions and the sentences 
imposed upon him. See APPENDIX ONE, Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, attached to Docketing Statement and incorporated therein 
by reference, at page 2 paragraph 4. 
6. Effective December 14, 1993, the Petitioner/Appellant was 
ordered by Respondent Utah Board of Pardons to "be paroled from the 
punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him." See APPENDIX 
ONE, at page 2 paragraph 5, attached to the Docketing Statement and 
APPENDIX TWO, Order of Parole, attached to the Docketing Statement. 
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7. Section 77-27-1(8), UCA 1953 as amended defines the term 
"parole" as "release from incarceration on prescribed conditions 
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, entitles him to 
a termination of sentence." 
8. Petitioner/Appellant agreed to abide by all the conditions 
of parole set forth in his Parole Agreement and several additional 
conditions set forth by the Utah Board of Pardons insofar as they 
are "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah." 
9. The first "special condition" set by Respondent Utah Board 
of Pardons was that Petitioner\Appellant enter and "successfully 
complete Halfway House Program." See APPENDIX ONE, Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus at page 2-3, paragraph 6 and APPENDIX TWO, 
Parole Agreement. 
10. The Halfway House Program referred to in Appellant's first 
special condition is a 12 month intensive inpatient sexual offender 
program conducted at community-based state correctional facilities 
that are known as "Community Correctional Centers." 
11. Shortly after Petitioner/Appellant arrived at the Freemont 
Community Correctional Center, he was required to sign a Community 
Corrections Center Program Agreement that says: 
Residence at this Center is a continuation of your period of 
confinement which is prescribed by law and which was ordered 
by one or more STATE COURTS and/or the BOARD of PARDONS.... 
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12. Section 77-27-10(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, says: 
If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to 
violate Section . . . 76-5-404.1 . . . [the Section that 
the Petitioner/Appellant was convicted of violating], is 
released on parole, the board [of Pardons] shall order 
outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a 
condition of parole (emphasis added). 
13. Chapter 27 of Title 77 does not distinguish between or 
define the terminology "outpatient mental health counseling and 
treatment" [from § 77-27-10(2)] or "inpatient" sex therapy [from 
the community correctional center sexual therapy program] . But, 
in State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, at 271 (Utah App. 1990), the 
statement of facts included the statement that an Adult Probation 
and Parole agent had described Community Corrections Centers as an 
"inpatient facility operated by the Department of Corrections." 
Also see § 62A-2-101(16), which defines "[o]utpatient treatment" as 
individual, family, or group therapy or counseling designed 
to improve or enhance social or psychological functioning 
for those whose physical and emotional status allows them 
to continue functioning in their usual living environment, 
(emphasis added). 
14. Petitioner/Appellant, believing the "special condition" 
requiring him to be reincarcerated to a halfway house for intensive 
"in-patient sexual therapy" as the condition of his parole when the 
language of § 77-27-10(2) mandates imposition of "outpatient mental 
health counseling and treatment" as one condition of his parole, 
sought to have that discrepancy resolved by then Assistant Attorney 
General, Kirk Torgensen, and by the Utah Board of Pardons, and thus 
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exhausted his state administrative remedies. Addendum A, Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus attached hereto and incorporated herein, 
pp. 3-4, paragraphs 6 to 10 and the Exhibits thereto. 
15. Petitioner/Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
asked the Court to decide whether imposition of "inpatient" sexual 
therapy and treatment for a year or more as a special condition of 
his parole is unlawful in light of mandatory language of § 77-27-
10(2) that requires the Utah Board of Pardons to impose "outpatient 
mental health counseling and treatment" as a condition of parole. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The broad constitutional and statutory powers of the Utah 
State Board of Pardons are limited by provisions of both state and 
federal constitutions. Article VII, Section 12(2)(a) of the Utah 
Constitution empowers the Legislature to set condition upon which 
the Board of Pardons may grant parole and subjects the Board's 
parole powers to regulations as provided by statute. 
Petitioner/Appellant alleges that the clear and unambiguous 
language of § 77-27-10(2) required the District Court to interpret 
the statute without looking behind the language of the statute in 
an attempt to divine the meaning of that language. Although the 
Legislature has plenary powers over many areas of state government 
and clearly could empower the Board of Pardons to parole inmates to 
community corrections centers, the Legislature has not yet acted to 
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empower the Board to do so. The Utah Court of Appeals must not let 
the Board of Pardons assume that power without constitutional and 
statutory authority, particularly in the face of a statute that 
acts to limit their otherwise broad powers to do so. 
The mandatory language of § 77-27-10(2), combined with the 
Parole Board's decision to parole a sexual offender, implicates 
a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Once such a liberty interest arises, 
federal, not state, law determines what process is due. Where the 
provision that creates the protectable interest also deprives the 
Board of Pardons of the jurisdiction to order any parole condition 
that is contrary to the condition mandated by the State Legislature 
pursuant to its plenary powers, subjecting a parolee to conditions 
that conflict with the legislature's statutory mandate violates the 
parolee's rights under substantive due process. The substantive 
due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment acts as a bar to 
certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the fairness of 
procedures used to implement them. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLENARY POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 
Unless limited by either the federal or state constitution, 
the theoretical power of the state legislature is nearly absolute. 
See Bruce C. Hafen, The Legislative Branch in Utah, 1966 Utah Law 
Review 416, 417 (September 1966), citing Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Darke, 167 P.2d 241 (1917). The Model State Constitution calls it 
"plenary power." See the National Municipal League, Model State 
Constitution §4.01, comment (6th ed. 1963). The Utah Supreme Court 
describes the legislative power: 
Our legislature is directly representative of the people of 
the sovereign state, and thus has inherently all of the powers 
of government except as otherwise specified by the State Con-
stitution. . . . Therefore, it can do any act or perform any fun-
ction not specifically prohibited by the State Constitution. 
Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 363, 374 P.2d 516 (Utah 1962). 
It is well settled that in the exercise of its police power, 
a state can enact regulations or laws reasonably necessary to 
secure the health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare 
of the community.... 
George v. Oren Ltd. & Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983). 
Like the State Legislature, the Board of Pardons is a body 
with both constitutional and statutory powers. But the authority 
of the Utah Board of Pardons is not absolute and yields to state 
or federal constitutional provisions. The Utah Board of Pardons 
has similarly broad discretionary powers. Court decisions about 
Utah's parole release procedures have not identified substantive 
limitations on the Board's discretionary release powers. 
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Absent statutory language which limits a parole board's 
discretion, which is the case in Utah [Utah Code Ann, 
§ 77-27-5 (1990)1, there is no federally protected liberty 
interest in parole release [See e.g. Greenholtz v. Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)] nor is there an expec-
tation of parole afforded by the federal constitution [Id.]. 
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
[Ujnder the Utah indeterminate sentencing system, the statute 
under which a defendant is convicted of, for example, a first 
degree felony, sets the time of imprisonment as a range, five 
years to life. If the trial judge sends the defendant to 
prison, the judge does not determine the number of years the 
defendant will spend there. That is left to the unfettered 
discretion of the board of pardons... 
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) . 
However, once the Utah Board of Pardons has extended parole 
to a sex offender, § 77-27-10(2) UCA clearly places a substantive 
limitation on the Board of Pardons' discretion. At that point the 
Legislative mandate is clear. It shall order "outpatient mental 
health and counseling" as a condition of parole. 
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
Well established principles of statutory interpretation and 
construction exist to provide guidance to the Courts 
Judicial responsibility to construe statutes must not be 
confused with legislative responsibility to enact them. 
Expanding the express language used by the legislature in 
this case ... would improperly exceed the limits of our 
judicial responsibility. 
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993) 
[Courts] have nothing to do with what the law ought to be. 
[They] must be guided by the law as it is. We cannot by 
construction liberalize the statute and enlarge its pro-
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visions. When language is clear and unambiguous, it must 
be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction. 
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993), citing Hanchett 
v. Burbidcre, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P.2d 377, 380 (Utah 1921). 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, appellate 
courts cannot look beyond the language to divine legislative 
intent, but must construe the statute according to its plain 
language. 
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993), citing State v. 
Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1992); Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989); and Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction at 
§ 4601 (5th ed. 1992) (if meaning of statute is plain, the "sole 
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms"). 
Further, courts typically construe statutes on the assumption 
that "each term is used advisedly and that the intent of the 
Legislative is revealed in the use of the term in the context 
and structure in which it is placed. 
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993), citing Ward v. 
Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984)(emph. added), aff'd 
on remand, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, 783 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1989), aff'd, 789 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
Each term in a statute should be interpreted according to 
its usual and commonly accepted meaning. Utah County v. 
Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1985)(footnotes omitted). 
We presume that words are used in their ordinary sense. In 
re adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Utah App. 1987). 
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, at 993 (Utah App. 1993). 
III. THE LEGISLATURE'S POWER OVER PAROLE 
Like the State Legislature, the Board of Pardons is a body 
with both constitutional and statutory powers. But the authority 
of the Utah Board of Pardons is not absolute and yields to state 
or federal constitutional provisions. 
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Article VII, Section 12(2) (a), Utah Constitution, provides: 
The Board of Pardons, by majority vote and upon other condi-
tions as provided by statute, may grant parole ... subject to 
regulations as provided by statute. 
That constitutional provision allows the Utah Legislature to 
condition the power of the Utah Board of Pardons to grant parole, 
etc., based on conditions provided by statute and subject the power 
to parole to regulations provided by statute. Except for statutory 
limitations pursuant to that constitutional provision and federal 
constitutional limitations on the Board's power, the Board's power 
in its constitutional and statutory realm would be almost plenary. 
One statutory limitation of the Board of Pardon's discretion 
is found at §77-27-10(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended which 
contains mandatory language requiring the Utah Board of Pardons to 
order sex offenders to "outpatient mental health counseling and 
treatment." The District Court and the persons who are responsible 
to represent the legal interests of the Utah Board of Pardons have 
interpreted § 77-27-10(2) as only setting a minimum requirement to 
be applied to sex offenders and that the statute can not prevent 
the Utah Board of Pardons from paroling sex offenders to community 
corrections centers for inpatient sexual therapy as a condition of 
that parole. 
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IV, THE TERM "SHALL" AS MANDATORY LANGUAGE 
In the recent Parole Rescission Hearing, another inmate raised 
the same issue that is presented by this appeal. The Utah Board of 
Pardons member cited to § 76-3-409 as a source of the Board's power 
to order treatment for the sexual offender. However, the language 
of that section, while somewhat ambiguous, appears to contemplate 
that the court, not the Board of Pardons', orders such treatment. 
Language used by the United States Supreme Court in their 
opinion in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 
452, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989), adds substantial 
strength to Petitioner/Appellant's position that UCA § 77-27-10(2) 
always requires the Board of Pardons to order "outpatient mental 
health counseling and treatment" as a condition of parole for sex 
offender. 
In that Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at page 1909, the Court says: 
[1] Stated simply, "a State creates a protected liberty 
interest by placing substantive limitations on official 
discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 
S.Ct. at 1747. 
Then, at page 1910, the U.S. Supreme Court states: 
We have also articulated a requirement, implicit in our 
earlier decisions, that the regulations contain "explicitly 
mandatory language," i.e., specific directives to the deci-
sionmaker that if the regulations substantive predicates are 
present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create 
a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 471-72, 
103 S.Ct., at 871-872. The regulations at issue in Hewitt 
[v. Helm,] mandated that certain procedures be followed, and 
"that administrative segregation will not occur absent speci-
fied substantive predicates." JEd. , at 472, 103 S.Ct., at 871. 
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In Board of Pardons v. Alien, [482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 
96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987)], the relevant statute used mandatory 
language ('shall') to 'create a presumption that parole re-
lease will be granted when the designated findings are made, " 
482 U.S., at 377-78, 107 S.Ct., at 2420-21, quoting Greenholtz 
v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106. 
See also id. , at 11, 99 S.Ct., at 2105 (statute providing that 
board "shall order" release unless one of four specified con-
ditions is found). In sum, the use of "explicitly mandatory 
language," in connection with the establishment of "specified 
substantive predicates" to limit discretion, forces a conclu-
sion that the State has created a liberty interest. Hewitt v. 
Helm, 459 U.S., at 472, 103 S.Ct., at 871. 
Implicit in Petitioner/Appellant's argument on appeal is the 
position that § 77-27-10(2) uses the explicit mandatory language 
("shall") to require the Board to always order "outpatient mental 
health counseling and treatment" as a condition of a sex offender's 
parole. That language appears to preclude the Utah Board of Pardon 
from ordering an extended inpatient sexual therapy at a community 
corrections center. 
As previously stated, the Utah Board of Pardons could lawfully 
achieve the same impact through the pre-parole use of the halfway 
house sexual therapy program, followed by parole with the required 
"outpatient mental health counseling and treatment" as a condition 
of that parole. 
The practical difference is that a program failure would not 
become a per se parole violation. The Utah Board of Pardon's over-
reliance on determinations of sexual therapists as their grounds 
for parole violations based on failure to successfully complete a 
sex therapy program may also constitute an unlawful delegation of 
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Board of Pardon powers to those sex therapists. Halfway houses 
are programs normally interposed between incarceration and parole. 
Petitioner/Appellant does not dispute the power of the Department 
of Corrections to transfer inmates to a Halfway House to complete 
an extended, intensive inpatient sex therapy program before he is 
entitled to parole. Petitioner/Appellant believes the mandatory 
language of UCA § 77-27-10(2) requires "outpatient mental health 
counseling and treatment" and that requirement is inconsistent with 
the Board of Pardon's discretion to order him to complete the same 
type of extended, intensive inpatient sexual therapy at a community 
corrections center as a special condition of his parole because the 
Board of Pardons is only empowered to order "special conditions of 
parole" that are "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah." 
In the State of Utah's Reply Brief to Respondent's to Brief of 
Amicus Curiae from Preece v. House, Case No. 920605 (Utah), counsel 
for the State of Utah responded to the amici's argument that the 
Utah Sentencing and Release Guideline be given the force of law 
contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's dicta that they do not have 
the force of law in Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 227 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 30, 33 (Utah, filed December 6, 1993), the attorney who 
represented the State of Utah argued that : 
[t]he operative word is 'should' rather than 'shall'" [see 
State's Reply Brief at page 2]. Later the State's attorney 
explained his prior statement about the "operative effect" 
of the terms 'should' and 'shall', stating that "The authors 
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of the [Sentence and Release] Guidelines purposely used the 
word 'should' rather than 'shall' to encourage the agencies 
to comply rather than to coerce them into automatic applica-
tion [of the Guidelines]• To date the legislature has not 
chosen them presumptive. This Court is bound to give recog-
nition of that fact. In Hewitt v. Helm, 459 U.S. 460, 471 
(1982), the United States Supreme Court expressed the policy 
rationale for refusing to import constitutional protection 
to procedural guidelines like Utah's Sentencing and Release 
Guidelines. 
The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the 
decision-making of prison officials is, in the view of 
many experts in the field, a salutary development. It 
would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on 
such desirable experimentation it thereby opens the 
door to scrutiny ... while States that choose not to 
adopt such procedural provision entirely avoid the 
strictures of the Due Process Clause." 
Hewitt v. Helm, 459 U.S. at 471. 
V. THE MEANING OF "OUTPATIENT" IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
Chapter 27 of Title 77 neither distinguishes between or 
defines the terminology "outpatient mental health counseling and 
treatment" [from § 77-27-10(2)] or "inpatient" sex therapy [from 
the community correctional center sexual therapy program]. But, 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, at 271 (Utah App. 1990), included 
the statement that an Adult Probation and Parole agent described 
Community Corrections Centers as an "inpatient facility operated by 
the [Utah] Department of Corrections." 
Although § 62A-2-10K16) , Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, 
is not directly applicable in this context, it may provide guidance 
as to what usual meaning of the term " [o]utpatient treatment" might 
be. It provides: 
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individual, family, or group therapy or counseling designed 
to improve or enhance social or psychological functioning 
for those whose physical and emotional status allows them 
to continue functioning in their usual living environment, 
(emphasis added). 
Therefore, paroling sex offenders to "inpatient residential 
treatment centers" like the Community Corrections Centers cannot 
equate to the "out patient mental health counseling" mandated by 
§ 77-27-10(2). State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 2270 (Utah App. 1990) 
(describing community corrections centers as "inpatient residential 
treatment centers"). 
VI. FEDERAL LAW, NOT STATE LAW, DEFINES THE PROCESS DUE 
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
539-541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492-1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that became known as "the 
bitter with the sweet" that had its genesis in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U.S. 134, 152, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1643-1644, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974). 
Arnett v. Kennedy involved a former federal employee's challenge to 
the procedures by which he was dismissed. The Arnett opinion 
states: 
The employee's statutory right is not a guarantee against 
removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee 
as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated 
for the determination of cause. . . . [W]here the grant of 
a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the lim-
itations on the procedures which are to be employed in deter-
mining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must 
take the bitter with the sweet. 
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The Loudermill Court rejected that argument, stating: 
... the "bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives the 
constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed, 
we provide it today. The point is straightforward: the Due 
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights -
life, liberty, and property - cannot be deprived except pur-
suant to constitutionally adequate procedures... "Property" 
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its depri-
vation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due 
process "is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by con-
stitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not 
to confer a property interest, it may not constitutionally 
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once confer-
red, without appropriate procedural safeguards... In short, 
once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, 
"the question remains what process is due." Morissev v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 
484 (1972) . 
An essential principle of due process is that deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). We 
have described "the root requirement" of the Due Process 
Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportun-
ity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant 
property interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 
379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)(emphasis in 
original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 
1586, 1591, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) . This principle requires 
"some kind of hearing" prior to the discharge of an emplo-
yee who has a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. [564], 
at 569-570, 92 S.Ct. [2701], 2705, [33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)]; 
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 
33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-541, 
105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492-1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). 
Where a government employee has a property interest in public 
employment, then temporary suspension without pay would not be de 
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minimus and would implicate protected property interests. See e.g. 
Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1985) and the cases cited 
therein. An entitlement to a "privilege" implicates due process 
principles. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 
1017-1018 (1970)(extent to which procedural due process must be 
afforded is influenced by the extent to which the recipient may 
be "condemned to suffer grievous loss"). 
VII. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Petitioner/Appellant alleges that the Utah Board of Pardons' 
creation of a policy or practice that imposes a parole condition 
that directly conflicts with existing constitutional and statutory 
rights to another parole condition triggers the protections of the 
"substantive due process" component of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it constitutes an arbitrary use of governmental power for 
purposes of oppression. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
also "contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as 
"substantive due process," which bars certain arbitrary government 
actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to im-
plement them.' Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 
88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). 
[B]y barring certain governmental actions regardless of 
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, 
it serves to prevent governmental power from being used 
for oppression. 
Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662, at 665. 
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Like specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, "substantive 
due process is violated at the moment the harm occurs [and 
therefore] the existence of a post-deprivation state remedy 
should not have any bearing on whether a cause of action ex-
ists under § 1983. 
E.g. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(citing cases). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, this Court should grant 
the Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
Refiled on this 1st day of July, 1994. 
HILTON & STEED, P.C. 
David S.' "SteecT 
Attorney for 
Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, first-class postage prepaid, 
to the following record counsel for Respondent/Appellee on the 
1st day of July, 1994: 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David S. St'eed 
Attorney for 
Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A - PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Nicholas V. Banner, #17049 
Attorney, Pro Se 
Fremont Correctional Center 
2588 West 2365 South 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS V. BANNER, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, BOARD OF 
PARDONS AND PAROLE, ] 
Respondent. 
| PETITION FOR WRIT OF | HABEAS CORPUS 
i Civil No. 
Petitioner Nicholas Vaughn Banner, pro se, pursuant to Rule 
65B(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions this Court 
to grant him a writ of habeas corpus, and states: 
1. Petitioner Nicholas Vaughn Banner is a citizen of the 
State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Petitioner is currently being held as a prisoner at the 
Fremont Correctional Center, 2588 West 2365 South, West Valley 
City, Utah 84119, as prisoner number 17049. Fremont Correctional 
Center is a state correctional center operated by the State of 
Utah, Department of Corrections. 
3. Respondent Board of Pardons and Parole is charged with 
the authority of determining when and under what conditions 
Petitioner may be released from his imprisonment, subject to Title 
77, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, as Amended, 
and other laws of the State of Utah. 
4. Petitioner is being held pursuant to two convictions and 
two concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years and one year 
entered after jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County by the Honorable Frank G. Noel on 
September 10, 1992. The convictions are sexual abuse of a child in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1, and lewdness involving a 
child in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5, and were entered 
in Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 831916801. See Judgment 
and Commitment Order, attached hereto as Exhibit "1". 
5. Such restraint is unlawful in that effective December 14, 
1993, it was determined and duly ordered by Respondent that 
Petitioner "be paroled from the punishment and sentence heretofore 
imposed upon him." See Order of Parole, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"2". 
6. That Petitioner agreed "to abide by all conditions of 
parole as set forth in [the Parole Agreement] and any additional 
conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, 
consistent with the laws of the State of Utah." The first "special 
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condition" of parole being that Petitioner enter and "successfully 
complete Halfway House Program." See Parole Agreement, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "3". 
7. Said "Halfway House Program" condition of parole is a 
twelve-month intensive in-patient sex offender program at a state 
correctional facility, which unlawfully countermands Respondent's 
Order that Petitioner "be paroled from the punishment and sentence 
heretofore imposed upon him." See Exhibit "2". It further flies 
in the face of Section 77-27-10(2) of the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which states: 
If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to 
violate Section ... 76-5-404.1 ... (the section of which 
Petitioner was convicted of having violated), is released 
on parole, the board shall order outpatient mental health 
counseling and treatment as a condition of parole 
(emphasis added). 
8. Upon discovery that the condition of parole in dispute is 
not "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah," Petitioner 
related this fact, in writing, to the Assistant Attorney General 
Kirk Torgensen, with whom Petitioner had previously discussed his 
concerns over the condition, and requested that Mr. Torgensen 
suggest to his client (the Respondent) that the condition be 
amended accordingly. See letter of Nicholas V. Banner to Kirk 
Torgensen, dated 8 November 1993, attached hereto as Exhibit "4". 
9. Petitioner's letter to Mr. Torgensen was referred to 
Assistant Attorney General James H. Beadles for a response. 
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Mr. Beadles contends that Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-10(2) "requires 
the Board to order outpatient therapy but it does not limit its 
authority to order inpatient therapy." See letter of James H. 
Beadles to Nicholas V. Banner dated 29 November 1993, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "5". Mr. Beadles' interpretation of the statute 
is contradictory, and is not accepted by Petitioner. 
10. Subsequently, Petitioner wrote directly to Respondent and 
requested that the in-patient sex-offender program condition of his 
parole be amended for the reasons that it is contrary to the Order 
of Parole, in violation of state law, and in conflict with the 
Parole Agreement that Petitioner abide by all conditions of parole, 
consistent with state law. See letter of Nicholas V. Banner to 
Board of Pardons Chairman Michael R. Sibbett dated 10 December 
1993, attached hereto as Exhibit "6". 
11. Petitioner's parole release date of December 14, 1993, 
however, has since come and gone, without the unlawful condition of 
parole complained of herein being changed by Respondent, causing 
Petitioner's current imprisonment to be in flagrant violation of 
his constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining parole 
release "from the punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon 
him", on 14 December 1993, and under lawful conditions, as per the 
Order of Parole. See Exhibit "2". 
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12. The legality of the restraint has not heretofore been 
adjudged. 
13. No previous application for a writ has been heretofore 
made. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests: 
1. That the Court issue a writ, requiring Respondent to 
appear with the person of Nicholas Vaughn Banner forthwith, and to 
serve and file his answer to the Complaint at or before such time; 
2. That at such time, the Court proceed to hear and 
determine the legality of such restraint and upon a determination 
that Nicholas Vaughn Banner is illegally or unlawfully restrained, 
order the release and discharge of Nicholas Vaughn Banner 
forthwith; and 
3. That Petitioner, who remains indigent, be allowed to 
proceed without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
DATED: December , 1993. 
Nicholas V. Banner 
Attorney, Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF PRO SE COUNSEL 
Nicholas Vaughn Banner, pro se, hereby certifies that the 
statements of fact in the foregoing Petition are true to his 
knowledge, and that statements made on information and belief are 
true to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
Nicholas V. Banner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 1993, I 
caused to be mailed, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus to the following; 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
6 
EXHIBIT "1" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NICHOLAS VAUGHN BANNER fUSP) 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
j f>««w« 831916801 
f Count No. . 
\ Honorable . 
( r.lArk 
1 Reporter 
J Railiff 
0*»t*» 
1 
FRANK G. NOEL 
P. JONES 
E. MIDGLEY 
J . BOND 
SEPT. 4 , 1992 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by 5? a jury; • the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A C H R P a felony 
of the 2nd degree, Q a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by J L GARCIA
 t and the State being represented hy H . LFMCKF isnow adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
& of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
n of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
. years and which may be for life; 
K) and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. M TF ANY 
COUNT 2 K) such sentence is to run concurrently with 
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) -
h DEFT TO RECEIVE CREDIT FOR *8 YEARS & 
are hereby dismissed. 
9 MONTHS A!RFAHY SFRVFn* 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
& Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH
 f ^ 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy Countv Attornev 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) TO 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
NICHOLAS VAUGHN BANNER (USP) 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
Count No. . 
Honorable . 
Clerk 
Rpnnrfftr 
Railiff 
Date . 
8 3 1 9 1 6 8 0 1 
2 
FRANK G. NOEL 
P. JONES 
F. MIDGLEY 
J . ROND 
SEPT. 4 . 1992 _ 
• The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by ffla jury; • the court; • plea of guilty; • plea 
of no contest; of the offense of LEWDNESS 
a class «fl misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by 
MAMMY PARTTA , and the State being represented by HOWARD I FMTKF , j S 
now adjudged guilty of the above offense, 
XL3 is now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
XC3 of 1 2 months; 
• and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
COUNT 1 X$ such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) 
• 
are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted *
 s t2y 0 f t h e above (C jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
XQt Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH _ ~ 
DATED this i__dayof ^ J ? U 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page of. 
JUDGE'S PRISON TERM RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to the provisions nf Section 77-18-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 1980,1 recommend that is^ pn< 
months-prior to release or parole the defendant serve 
Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 
-•^n^t, H ^L -\ ^ YS/ r i u i u ^ (^ l&Sc^A 3b£**flL4dLt 
C^-7^\ xU £. 
XL. ±L ix- ^/ ^L^rfc ^^V* (i, ~ ^ . ^ / ^ W " ^ M"y"~ rs* ^niir i A ^ ^ Z ^ ^ g 1 , )> ^ r4> f L£~ 
^ . r l 
.zc 
DATED this a^ . day of j^: 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS 0 A 
ORIGINAL 
oismof 
urn* 
•pism . 
"•flar-i. iqox 
.1 r ±J± 
OffUTV COURT 
Page of 
EXHIBIT "2" 
Norman H. Bang«rUr 
Governor 
H. L (Prft) Haun 
Chairman 
Members 
Donald E, Btanchard 
Michael R. Slbbett 
William L Peters 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00025683 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 17049 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF BANNER, NICHOLAS VAUGHN 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or 
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons 
in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 3rd day of January, 1991, and the 
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to 
appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that BANNER, NICHOLAS VAUGHN be paroled from the 
punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the 
Third District Court in and for the County or Salt Lake for the crime(s) of 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILD, 2nd degree felony, Expiration 12/02/98. 
The parole shall not become effective until 14th day of December, 1993. 
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by 
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be 
administered by duly authorized agents of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant 
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah 
State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah 
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law or the State of 
Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this Order of Parole is 
revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1991. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 
8th day of January, 1991, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and 
hereby affix my signature as Chairman for and on behalf of the State of 
Utah, Board of Pardons. 
4? 
H . L : HAUN, Cha/rnfan 
EXHIBIT "3" 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 
I, BANNER, NICHOLAS VAUGHN agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of 
the Utah State Department of Corrections and be accountable for my" actions and 
conduct to Utah State Corrections, according to this Agreement. 
I further agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this 
Agreement and any additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of 
Pardons, consistent with the laws of the State of Utah, I fully understand 
that the violation of this Agreement and/or any conditions thereof or any new 
conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing my parole to 
be revoked or my parole period to start over. 
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE 
1. RELEASE: On the day of my release from the institution or confinement, 
I will report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise 
approved in writing. 
2. RESIDENCE: I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at 
such residence in fact and on record and shall not change my 
?lace of residence without knowledge of my Parole Agent; and shall not leave the State of Utah without prior written 
authorization from my Parole Agent. It is hereby acknowledged 
that should I leave the State of Utah without written 
authorization from my Parole Agent that I hereby waive 
extradition, from any state in which I may be found, to the 
State of Utah. 
CONDUCT: I shall obey all State and Federal laws and municipal 
ordinances at all times. 
REPORT: I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent 
by the fifth of each and every month or as directed and I 
snail permit visits to my place of residence as required by 
' ' ' " " ' ' * ' 1th 
3. 
my Parole Agent for the purpose of insuring compliance wit 
the conditions of parole. 
I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am 
participating in an educational or therapy program approved 
fey my Parole Agent. 
I agree to allow a Parole Agent to search my person, 
residence, vehicle, or any other property under my control, 
without a warrant, any time day or nieht, upon reasonable 
suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure 
compliance with the conditions of my parole. 
I snail not own. possess, or have under my control or in my 
custody any explosives, rirearems, or any dangerous weapons 
as defined in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-501, as 
amended. 
I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner 
which can reasonably be expected to result in, or which has 
resulted in criminal or illegal activity. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall: 
"7^51 Successfully complete Halfway House Program. 
y j£ 2 Not consume or possess any alcohol. 
1>^3 Take antabuse as prescribed by a physician. 
Y'jg ^  Abide by Sex Offender Special Conditions Group A. 
iJjr',5 Remit fine. jjfcb Successfully complete ISP if available where residing. 
EMPLOYMENT: 
SEARCH: 
WEAPONS: 
8. ASSOCIATION: 
I have read, understand an 
acknowledge receipt #f a c 
WITNESSED BY: 
TITLE: 
agree to the above conditions and I hereby |py of this Agreement. 
wUI/^ 
Cha irman, Board of Pardons 
this /Xr7^) day oi 
SIGNED: ^KJ 
ADDRESS: 
Q*U. 
Parolee 
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EXHIBIT "5" 
J A N G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOHN F. CLARK CAROL CLAWSON REED RICHARDS PALMER DEPAULIS 
Counsel to the Attorney General Solicitor General Chief Deputy Attorney General Director of Public Policy & Communications 
29 November 1993 
Nicholas V. Banner 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Subject: Your letter of 8 November 1993 regarding sex offender therapy 
Dear Mr. Banner: 
Kirk Torgensen has referred your letter to me for a response. The substance of your 
complaint, as I understand it, challenges the Board of Pardons' authority to order you into 
inpatient sex offender therapy. You refer to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 to allow the Board 
to order outpatient therapy only. That interpretation misconstrues the statute. The statute 
requires the Board to order outpatient therapy but it does not limit its authority to order inpatient 
therapy. That is, the statute sets a minimum (outpatient therapy) but does not restrict the Board 
from going beyond that minimal requirement in certain cases. Obviously, your case must be one 
of those cases in which the Board felt it necessary to order inpatient therapy. This is a proper 
exercise of the Board's lawful discretion. 
I hope this letter is responsive to your concerns. 
Respectfully, 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
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EXHIBIT "6" 
Nicholas V. Banner, #17049 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
December 10, 1993 
Mr. Michael R. Sibbett, Chairman 
State of Utah, Board of Pardons 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Re: Parole of Nicholas V. Banner, U.S.P. No. 17049; 
OBSCIS No. 00025683 
Dear Mr. Sibbett: 
By order of the Board of Pardons, I am to be released on parole 
from the Utah State Prison on 14 December 1993, with the first condition 
of parole being that I enter and complete an in-patient sex offender 
program at a community correctional center. In the light of documented 
safety-concerns that I have over my placement into such a setting, 
eleven months ago I requested that the Board reconsider this require-
ment, but no change was made. Since that time, for various other valid 
reasons, similar requests to have the condition deleted or amended were 
made in my behalf by a clinical_psychologist, an attorney, a case 
worker, and a parole agent; nevertheless, all were denied without 
explanation. Therefore, notwithstanding its unfeasability as applied to 
my situation, I was left with the distinct impression that I either 
agree to said condition of parole or face forfeiture of my release date 
— on this basis, I agreed (see enclosed signed copy of Parole 
Agreement). 
I have since discovered, however, that the condition of my parole 
requiring further confinement under the current sentence, for the 
purpose of entering into an in-patient sex offender program, cannot 
legally stand, based upon the following: (1) that by Order of Parole 
(copy enclosed), I am to ".. .be paroled from the punishment and sentence 
heretofore imposed upon [me]..." (emphasis mine); (2) that by legisla-
tive mandate, when a sex offender "...is released on parole, the board 
shall order outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a 
condition of parole", Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, § 77-27-10(2) 
(emphasis mine); and {3) that by Parole Agreement (copy enclosed), 
"I...agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this 
Agreement and any additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State 
Board of Pardons, consistent with the laws of the State of Utah" 
(emphas is mine). 
To be "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah", it would 
appear from the foregoing analysis that the condition in dispute should 
be amended accordingly. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Nicholas V. Banner 
cc: Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
ADDENDUM B - ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Nicholas B. Banner, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Board of Pardons and Parole 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO: 930907321 HC 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
The court has reviewed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and finds it to be 
frivolous on its face for the following reasons: 
The provision of the Utah Code relied upon by petitioner, ie, 77-27-10(2) is not a 
limitation on the Board's authority except insofar as it requires the Board to order, at a 
minimum, outpatient therapy. The Board is also required by law to exercise their discretion in 
such a way as to reasonably protect the community and to assist the offender to lead a law-
abiding life. The referenced provision of the code in no way prevents the Board from ordering 
inpatient treatment as a condition of probation. 
For these reasons the court hereby dismisses this petition. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this J> day of January, 1994. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
^ f c r , . 
BANNER V. BOARD OF PARDONS PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal, 
postage prepaid, to the following this Q day of January, 1994. 
Nicholas V. Banner 
Petitioner 
Fremont Correctional Center 
2588 West 2365 South 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
o 
ADDENDUM C - NOTICE OF APPEAL 
r-
C< 
Nicholas V. Banner, #17049 
Attorney Pro Se 
Fremont Correctional Center 
2588 West 2365 South 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
KB 0 2 f994 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
NICHOLAS V. BANNER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, BOARD OF 
PARDONS & PAROLE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. 930907321HC 
Judge Frank 6. Noel 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Nicholas 
V, Banner, Pro Se, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final 
Order of the Honorable Frank G. Noel entered in this matter on 
January 5, 1994. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED: February , 1994. 
Nicholas V. Banner 
Attorney, Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1994, I 
caused to be mailed, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the 
following: 
James K. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM D - STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Section 77-27-10(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, says: 
If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to 
violate Section . . . 76-5-404.1 . . . [the Section that 
the Petitioner/Appellant was convicted of violating], is 
released on parole, the board [of Pardons] shall order 
outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a 
condition of parole (emphasis added). 
2. § 62A-2-10K16) , Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, defines 
M[o]utpatient treatment" as: 
individual, family, or group therapy or counseling designed 
to improve or enhance social or psychological functioning 
for those whose physical and emotional status allows them 
to continue functioning in their usual living environment, 
(emphasis added). 
ADDENDUM E - CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
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